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Abstract
Many emerging market economies (EMs) have adopted a ﬂoating exchange rate regime
after currency crises. Since 1999 Brazil has experienced a ﬂoating regime combined with
inﬂation targeting. The Central Bank varies the interest rates in order to reach the
targeted inﬂation rates and consequently the variability of the interest rates has been
higher than the variability of the exchange rates. According to some economists, this is
a clear symptom of the fear of ﬂoating and Brazil can not be an exception among the
EMs. After assessing the behavior of the exchange rates and interest rates associated with
other macroeconomic variables, this paper concludes that Brazil has not suﬀered from the
fear of ﬂoating and that the Brazilian Central Bank does not care about exchange rate
dynamics as much as it does about inﬂation.
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Brazilian Central Bank, Fear of Floating
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Resumo
Muitas economias emergentes tˆ em adotado regime de taxa de cˆ ambio ﬂutuante ap´ os
sofrerem crises cambiais. O Brasil vem experimentando o regime de cˆ ambio ﬂutuante
combinado com metas de inﬂa¸ c˜ ao desde 1999. O Banco Central altera a taxa de juros
com o objetivo de alcan¸ car a inﬂa¸ c˜ ao da meta e conseq¨ uentemente a variabilidade da
taxa de juros tem sido maior do que a da taxa de cˆ ambio. De acordo com alguns
economistas este ´ e um sintoma de “medo de ﬂutuar” e o Brasil n˜ ao ´ e uma exce¸ c˜ ao entre
as economias emergentes. Ap´ os analisar o comportamento da taxa de cˆ ambio e da taxa
de juros associada com outras vari´ aveis macroeconˆ omicas, este paper conclui que o Brasil
n˜ ao sofre do “medo de ﬂutuar” e que o Banco Central se preocupa muito mais com a
inﬂa¸ c˜ ao do que com a dinˆ amica da taxa de cˆ ambio propriamente dita.
⋆ Received in June 2005, accepted in October 2005. Without in any way implicating them, the
author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments provided by Prof. Barry Eichengreen (University
of California, Berkeley), Prof. Harley Shaiken, Chair of CLAS (Center for Latin American Studies,
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1. Introduction
According to IMF’s De Jure Classiﬁcation (2004), Brazil has experienced
an independently ﬂoating exchange rate regime even in terms of Bubula and
¨ Otker-Rober (2002)’s De Facto classiﬁcation. On the other hand, Calvo and
Reinhart (2002) found that countries that say they allow their exchange rates to
ﬂoat mostly do not and consequently, they suﬀer from an epidemic case of the “fear
of ﬂoating”. The debate about the way emerging market economies deal with their
exchange rates may be associated with the choice from hard pegs, target zones to
greater ﬂexibility and whether or not the corner solution is valid both theoretically
and on empirical grounds (bipolar view provided by Fischer (2001)) holds. However,
many developing countries occupy the middle ground making intensive use of
interest rates and foreign exchange reserves intervention in order to limit their
exchange rates volatility. In this article we regard this care about the exchange
rate variability as the strong “fear of ﬂoating”.
In order to observe this phenomenon, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) introduced an
exchange rate index motivated by a model that considers the importance of the
role played by the interest rates and the foreign exchange reserves. They found that
variability of both international reserves, despite their measurement diﬃculties, and
interest rates are relatively high related to the exchange rate variations. The reasons
why countries may be reluctant to tolerate great variation in their exchange rates
are associated with three aspects:
(i) lack of credibility;
(ii) high pass-through from exchange rate to domestic prices; and
(iii) inﬂation targeting.
It could also be related to liability dollarization, output costs associated with
exchange rate ﬂuctuations and loss of access to international capital markets.
However, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) pay special attention to the combination of
these three facts to explain the phenomenon.
In the real world, central banks of the emerging market economies are attempting
to stabilize the exchange rate through open market intervention. Figure 1 shows
that interest rate variability is bigger than the exchange rate variability in Brazil
after adopting ﬂoating regime. Standard deviation of the monthly return of
Over-Selic was about 12% while the standard deviation of the return of exchange
rate was about 9.5%. In this case, the fear of ﬂoating in the strong sense would be
observed.
support provided by CAPES and CNPq. I wish to acknowledge the helpful comments provide by the
anonymous referees.
Email address: mholland@fgvsp.br















2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1a.Diff Exchange Rate 1a. Dif Interest Rate
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. 
1a.Diff. Over-Selic 
1a. Diff. Exch. Rate 
Fig. 1. Brazil: Variability of Log of the Interest Rate and Exchange Rate (1999-2005)
Eichengreen (2002) suggests that the central bank, even having concerns about
the exchange rate variability, does not care about exchange rate in the same way it
does about inﬂation. Moreover, while a central bank raises interest rates in order
to smooth the depreciation of the domestic currency, mainly during “Calvo shock”
(a sudden stop in the capital inﬂows), “it will not prevent the exchange rate from
moving, as the strong ’fear of ﬂoating’ view would suggest. (...) Thus, while the
degree of exchange rate ﬂexibility will be limited by central bank policy, such
ﬂexibility will not be eliminated entirely. The currency will still exhibit greater
ﬂexibility than when it is pegged” (Eichengreen (2002):15). The consequence of
this argument is that the more temporary the Calvo shock is the less the fear of
ﬂoating would be.
Again, the central bank can not display the fear of ﬂoating when it has no
instruments to prevent the exchange rate from adjusting to a new long-term
equilibrium. Certainly, it can raise the interest rates if the exchange rates
depreciate, even though there is no real reason to believe that it will reduce the
interest rates when the exchange rates appreciate. Then, the fear of ﬂoating can
fail.
The main aim of this paper is to provide some evidence whether or not the
Central Bank of Brazil has displayed the fear of ﬂoating of the exchange rates,
although inﬂation rates remain a great concern, and Brazil may show some
aggravates such as relative high speed of passthrough, diﬃculty of forecasting
inﬂation, liability dollarization and credibility issues, as pointed out by Eichengreen
(2002) as elements that diﬀerentiate emerging market economies from developed
economies. In the Brazilian case what remains the main concern is the problem of
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monetary policy credibility associated with both diﬃculties of forecasting inﬂation
and short-term liabilities rather than dollarization liabilities.
2. The Brazilian Experience
In January 1999, after a strong currency crisis, Brazil implemented the ﬂexible
exchange rate regime. More than six years later, have Brazilian policymakers
allowed the domestic currency to ﬂoat less than predicted by its classiﬁcation and
exhibited the fear of ﬂoating? In other words, has the Central Bank of Brazil used
foreign reserves and short term interest rates to limit exchange rate volatility?
Even if Brazil has pursued this policy is it the fear of ﬂoating or a symptom of the
inability of ﬁxing? Does the Central Bank in an emerging market economy really
have the ability to prevent high exchange rate ﬂexibility?
Figure 2 shows the nominal exchange rate dynamics and at a ﬁrst glance it is
fair to say that the domestic currency has ﬂoated quite a lot since 1999. 1 The
high exchange rate volatility is an important issue in the eyes of the ﬁnancial
markets. Once more we could not disregard the idea that the Brazilian currency
has been volatile. From January 1999 to January 2005, about six years of the
ﬂoating regime, the nominal and real and eﬀective exchange rates varied about 10
and 6 percent per month, respectively. Even highly volatile, the real and eﬀective
exchange rates showed unequivocal downward movement and the domestic currency
has appreciated about 22 per cent since the ﬂexible regime (using WPI – Wholesale
Price Index– as deﬂator). This last fact can reveal the “fear of depreciating”. The
Central Bank has not reduced the interest rates to prevent appreciation. However,
using the other deﬂator (CPI – Consumer Price Index), can be seen a very diﬀerent
situation. Domestic currency would have appreciated about 23 per cent over that
period of time, that is, there is no fear of depreciation. Figure 3 shows this apparent
ambiguousness. How could this diﬀerence be explained?
The diﬀerence between these two deﬂators (wholesale and consumer price
indexes) may origin from another mechanism that goes beyond the exchange rate
dynamics which might be closed associated with the responses of the central
bank in the circumstances of the Calvo shock by increasing interest rates and,
therefore, depressing the components of aggregate demand, such as investment
and consumption. Thus, the lower the aggregate consumption is, the lower the
passthrough from wholesale prices to consumer prices will be. 2 It seems like the
“Prebisch shock” as labeled by Eichengreen (2002):18:“Now there are two oﬀsetting
eﬀects on inﬂation: while higher import prices will be passed through into inﬂation,
weaker aggregate demand will be deﬂationary”.
Let’s fall back on the idiosyncratic features some emerging market economies
can show that may make a diﬀerence when compared to developed economies. We
1 Even real and eﬀective depreciation has been far higher now than in previous period of time.
2 Commodities and administrated prices should be taken into account in further research.
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Fig. 2. Brazil: Real-USD Exchange Rate Variability -1st. Diﬀ (1992-2005)

















































































































































































































































































Source: IPEA  
Notes: REERCPI = Real and Effective Exchange Rate deflated by the Consumer Price Index; 
REERWPI = Real and Effective Exchange rate deflated by the Wholesale Price Index.  
REERCPI 
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Fig. 3. Brazil: Real and Eﬀective Exchange Rate: Appreciation or Depreciation?
(1999-2005) 1999:01=100
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3. Liability Dollarization
At the end of the pegged exchange rate regime, in December 1998, the U.S.
Dollar-denominated federal debt averaged 20 percent of the total debt and it
increased to 28.65 percent in the ﬁrst two years of the ﬂoating regime (see Figure
4). Afterwards, one can see a clear downward movement of the dollar-denominated
debt and a switch towards bonds denominated in short term interest rates and
inﬂation rates (IGP – General Price Index). However, the high and stable level of
the federal debt denominated in post ﬁxed interest rates (Over-Selic) remains high.
Thus, it is unequivocally fair to say that Brazil suﬀers from the “domestic original
sin” (Eichengreen et al. 2003) since the country cannot borrow long term in its own
domestic currency, 3 although the great reduction in the Dollar denominated debt
can be considered an important result in an emerging market economy like Brazil
and is therefore an important instrument to prevent ﬁnancial instability.
How does the central bank deal with the exchange rates when it has concerns
about its Dollar-denominated debt? It is unambiguous that meanwhile the Brazilian
currency had been depreciating, the Central Bank was appropriately swapping
the U.S. Dollar-denominated debt instruments for inﬂation rates and short-term
interest rate denominated ones.
In the eyes of the market the commitment of the central bank with the inﬂation,
mainly in countries under inﬂation target like Brazil, and even under credibility
building process, the ongoing raises of the interest rates can be expressed in a
positively sloped forward interest rate curve which means that short term debt
instruments are frequently preferred to the others. In Brazil, this dynamics did
not oﬀset the reduction of the liability dollarization and both total (external and
internal) debt and then domestic debt related to GDP kept increasing after ﬂoating
regime (Figure 5). Although the recent downward movement is worth of note, it is
still unpredictable and far from the average levels previous to 1999.
Thus, the dollarization liability issues can be changed to short-term liability. In
this case, federal debt can emanate signs of the strength or weakness to the markets.
Emerging market economies with high short-term federal debt and high government
debt levels are more prone to suﬀer deeply during Calvo shock (Frankel and Wei
2004). Analyzing the Brazilian case in 2002 and 2003, Blanchard (2004) found that
“the level and the composition of public debt in Brazil, and the general level of risk
aversion in world ﬁnancial markets, were indeed such as to imply perverse eﬀects
of the interest rates on the exchange rates and on inﬂation”.
3 The authors calculated the indicator of original sin for some countries according to main
characteristics (total amount, maturity, currency and coupon) of the various governmental bounds
present in each market. In a range from 0 (a country that issues all its securities in own currency) to 1
(a country that issues all its securities in foreign currencies), Brazil has 0.915.
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Fig. 4. Brazilian Federal Debt – Bonds Issued Participation by Denomination (1994-2005)
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Fig. 5. Brazil: Total and Domestic Public Debt – Percent of the GDP (1992-2005)
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4. Sources of Exchange Rates Volatility in Brazil
Putting together the virtual sources of exchange rate volatility in Brazil is an
extremely complex task. However, we can fairly sum up four important sources
of volatility: 1) inﬂation; 2) credibility; 3) liability composition and level; and 4)
degree of openness. 4 We can also take into account that they are not isolated
problems “living on the Robinson Crusoe’s island”, especially in emerging market
economies. Credibility is built, indeed, under low inﬂation regime and with no
currency mismatches.
Before evaluating the source of exchange rate volatility we should ask if Brazilian
currency has really experienced low volatility. Certainly, the next question would be
about the benchmark. Which type of asset could be considered a good benchmark?
And what period of time could be used for comparison? The main point that can
be drawn from Mark (2001:70) when the author compared descriptive statistics
for exchange rates and equity returns, after developed countries implement ﬂexible
exchange rate regimes (1973-1997), is that “the volatility of the exchange rate
returns is virtually indistinguishable from stock return volatility”. Standard
deviations calculated by Mark (2001) for the dollar quarterly returns were
5.5 percent, 6.35 percent and 6.08 percent on pound, deutschmark and yen,
respectively.
In the Brazilian case, the monthly standard deviation reached nearby 5 percent
and averaged 3.5 percent, from 1999 to 2004. Regarding the fact that we calculated
the standard deviation using a diﬀerent method from Mark (2001) and annualizing
the data, it can be concluded that the exchange rate volatility in Brazil is far higher
than in developed economies (Figure 6 illustrates this fact), during their golden
time of ﬂoating. At the beginning of the inﬂation targeting system, from July 1999
to June 2002, according to Minella (2002):26: “the volatility of the exchange rates
has been considerable”, with a variation coeﬃcient of 3 percent calculated using
monthly exchange rates. Figure 6 shows the monthly volatility averaged at the
same 3 percent in the entire period from 1999 to 2005.
However, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) suggest estimating the exchange rate
volatility by considering instruments of the monetary policy such as interest rates
and foreign exchange reserves, which results in the Exchange Rate Flexibility Index






F are the variances of
the exchange rates, interest rates and foreign reserves, respectively. Then, the λ
can range from zero, when there is a peg or a very high degree of commitment
to inﬂation targeting, to 1, when seignorage weighs heavily in the policymaker’s
objective function (Calvo and Reinhart (2002):402). Despite some algebra issues,
we have some reservations about this idea. First of all, and theoretically speaking,
4 In this article we are not going to discuss openness issues either ﬁnancial or trade openness. Correlated
questions about capital control and policy recommendation such as capital account convertibility can
be found in Arida et al. (2004), and a comprehensive and critical empirical analysis was provided by
Gon¸ calves et al. (2005).
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Fig. 6. Brazil: Monthly Conditional Standard Deviation of the Nominal Exchange Rate
(1999-2004) – percent
there are sharp distinctions between pegged and inﬂation target regimes which
were disregarded such as the own exchange rate volatility. It is expected that the
exchange rates more volatile in inﬂation-target countries than in pegger ones, unless
the authors really believe that the inﬂation targeting may lead the central bank
to intervene in the exchange rate market in the same way it would do in a pegged
regime context.
Secondly, and taking a look at the other side of the range, when λ can be nearby
the 1, the exchange rate ﬂexibility is therefore quite high, possibly expressing other
features beyond the seignorage, such as the “inability of ﬁxing” rather than the
“fear of ﬂoating”. This means that some Central Banks are unable to both avoid
short-term nominal exchange rate movements and evaluate the eﬀects caused by
an unwilling long-term real and eﬀective exchange rate trajectory. The assessment
of Figure 3 comes out with this concern. Central Banks have completely diﬀerent
signs coming from diﬀerent sorts of shocks (both “Calvo shock” and “Prebisch
shock”). Once more, Brazil is not an exception.
Finally, there is a clear endogeneity problem among these variables. In a simple
model that describes why a country might prefer a smooth exchange rates, Calvo
and Reinhart (2002):399 assume that the “variance of the exchange rates are
independent of the variance of the risk premium”. However, one of the most
likely important sources of the volatility of exchange rates in Brazil may be the
variance of the risk premium (Figure 7). In Blanchard (2004):10, “An increase in
the probability of default increases risk. This increase in risk leads to an increase in
the exchange rates: to depreciation. For a given probability of default, an increase
in the interest rates leads to a decrease in the exchange rates, to an appreciation:
the standard channel through which monetary policy aﬀects the exchange rates”. In
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addition, “the eﬀect of an increase in the interest rates is, then, either to leave the
probability of default unchanged (if next-period debt remains below the critical
level), or to increase the probability of default. The eﬀect is again stronger, the























Source: Central Bank of Brazil 
Fig. 7. Brazil: Exchange Rate, Country Risk and Interest Rate (1999-2005) (Mean
adjusted)
Now, the VAR (Vector Autoregression) analysis is an appropriate way to deal
with these sources of volatility, especially because of the causality and endogeneity
problems. In this case, we estimated the VAR (1) 5 to analyze the impulse-response
functions and variance decomposition. 6 In order to estimate the basic relationship
established by the fear of ﬂoating hypothesis, Figure 8 shows the response of the
exchange rates to innovations in interest rates (Over-Selic).
5 After testing diﬀerent orders of the VAR and based on information criteria tests, VAR(1) was selected.
All variables were tested for unit roots using diﬀerent tests (ADF and Phillips-Perron) for each time
series. All of them suggest that the time series are integreted of order one, i.e., I(1), although other
unit root tests (Ng Perron and Elliot-Rothenberg-Stock Point-Optimal) indicated inconsistent results.
As we run VAR (1) with non-integrated variables this inconsistence does not lead to further problems
in our estimations.
6 It is fair to use the VAR speciﬁcation for forecasting systems of interrelated time series to analyze
the dynamic impact of random disturbances on the system of variables. Once we have speciﬁed the
VAR, we estimated the impulse-response functions and variance decomposition. An impulse-response
function traces the eﬀect of a one standard deviation shock to one of the innovations on current and
future values of the endogenous variables. In summary, impulse- response functions trace the eﬀect of a
shock to an endogenous variable into the VAR. On the other hand, the variance decomposition provides
a diﬀerent method of depicting the system dynamics. It decomposes variation of an endogenous variable
into the component shocks to the endogenous variables in the VAR. The variance decomposition gives
information about the relative importance of each random innovation to the variables in the VAR. VAR
impulse response functions and decompositions feature standard errors calculated either analytically or
by Monte Carlo methods (analytic not available for decompositions in E-Views 4.1).
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Fig. 8. Impulse-Response Function in Brazil: Interest Rate and Exchange Rate (1999-2005)
Once more, we do not include foreign reserves because of several measurement
problems 7 and the VAR was controlled by other important variables such as
country risk, foreign interest rates (U. S. Federal Fund) and domestic and foreign
(U.S.A.) inﬂation rates. The ﬁrst insights one can draw after examining Figure 8 is
the clear evidence that the exchange rates do not respond statistically signiﬁcantly
to innovations in the interest rates, even under tremendous increases in the nominal
interest rates by the Brazilian Central Bank.
As well-known in the economic literature, the nominal exchange rates can be
expressed by the uncovered interest parity condition (UIP) and, consequently,
expected changes in the exchange rates between two countries is equal to their
interest rates diﬀerential and a risk premium, according to the following equation:
△et = γ1△iF
t + γ2△xt − γ3△it + ηt
where: △et is the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the log of exchange rates; △iF
t is the ﬁrst
diﬀerence of the log of foreign interest rates measured by Federal Fund rate in the
U. S. A; △xt is the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the log of risk premium measured by EMBI
+ J. P. Morgan; △it is the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the log of domestic interest rates
(Over-Selic); and ηt is a white noise process. According to Table 1, it is fair to say
that country risk plays an indistinguishable role in the exchange rates variation
determination.
7 In Holland (2003:22), “a more careful look suggests that we can observe a diﬀerent and concerning
situation when international exchange reserves are adjusted after considering liabilities associated with
them, which represents a signiﬁcant portion of international liquidity. In May 2004, adjusted (to
liabilities) international reserves were US$24,700 billions instead of US$50,497 billions”. Calvo and
Reinhart (2002):388–389) also pointed out concerns about the “hidden” foreign exchange reserves.
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Table 1
UIP Condition (1999:07-2005:01)
γ1 γ2 γ3 R
2 DW N
(Foreing interest rate) Contry risk (Domestic interest rate)
−0.06 0.24
∗∗ 0.02 84% 2.2 66
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
(∗∗)signiﬁcant at 5%; we implemented dummy variables for Presidential Election (2002).
On the other hand, according to Table 2, for the full period of the ﬂoating
regime (1999-2005), almost forty percent (40%) 8 of the variance of the exchange
rates, after ten months, can be explained by reactions to shocks from country
risk variation, and only about 1 percent (0.9%), after ten months, for the case
of interest rates. 9 However, during the 2002 Calvo shock (Presidential Election),
Table 3 shows the importance of the inﬂation shock in the exchange rate variance
(5.85%), and the interest rate forecast-error explained in more detail in this
speciﬁc sample (2001:07-2003:06). Then, the forecast-error variance of exchange
rates attributable to the orthogonalized innovations in interest rates is relatively
low and 9.7% for full sample i.e., 1999:01-2005:01, and the sample of stress, i.e.,
2001:07-2003:06 – herein considered as Presidential Election Shock –, respectively),
so we can conclude that the Brazilian Central Bank does not suﬀer from the fear of
ﬂoating, in the way we deﬁned before. Moreover, some inability of ﬁxing is closely
associated with its ﬁscal constraint (Blanchard (2004) and Holland and Vieira
(2003)). Most importantly, the “domestic original sin” (Eichengreen and Hausmann
1999) expressed by high short-term federal debt reveals the way the central bank
borrows and its consequences in terms of its low autonomy in intervening in the
exchange rate market.
5. Final Remarks
This article presented empirical evidence analyzing the hypothesis of the fear
of ﬂoating, and the Brazilian Central Bank does not exhibit this phenomenon.
We presented some considerations about the dollarization liability issues, but the
domestic original sin remains a great concern since the short-term public debt is
the highest portion of the domestic debt. Lack of credibility associated with both
diﬃculties in forecasting inﬂation and in reaching the target of the inﬂation and, at
the same time, high and volatile risk premium can be the main factors to explain
the inability of ﬁxing, that is, the shortsightedness in managing the exchange rates.
8 Apparently strong this result is close to empirical ﬁndings in Loureiro and Holanda Barbosa (2004),
when the authors drawn the conclusion that ﬁscal debt is much more important than the current account
in explaining risk premium shocks.
9 Diﬀerent Cholesky Orderings were tested and the results kept the same.
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Table 2
Variance Decomposition of Exchange Rate (1999-2005)
Period S.E. US FF Risk Over-Selic Exchange Rate
(Return) (EMBI+Return) (Return) (Depreciation)
1 0.049 0.40 38.77 0.50 60.31
2 0.056 0.66 41.70 0.75 56.87
3 0.059 0.82 39.49 0.73 58.94
5 0.060 0.87 38.69 0.86 59.56
10 0.060 0.88 38.43 0.90 59.77
Cholesky Ordering: US Federal Fund (FF), Risk, Domestic Interest Rate
(Over-Selic) and Exchange Rate.
Table 3
Variance Decomposition of Exchange Rate “Calvo Shock” (2001:07-2003:06)
Period S.E. Domestic Over-selic Risk US FF Exchange Rate US inﬂation
(Inﬂation (CPI) (Return) (Return) (Return) (Depreciation) (WPI)
1 0.031 3.82 7.58 51.43 0.16 36.99 0.00
2 0.037 2.89 6.00 47.09 2.74 38.91 2.35
3 0.041 4.66 8.71 40.61 2.37 40.72 2.89
4 0.043 5.41 8.85 37.60 3.32 40.66 4.13
5 0.044 5.67 9.50 36.33 3.22 40.73 4.53
10 0.045 5.85 9.75 35.68 3.37 40.28 5.04
Domestic Inﬂation, Domestic Interest Rate (Over-Selic), Risk (EMBI+),
US Federal Fund (FF), Exchange Rate, US Inﬂation (WPI).
This article also sheds light on the idea that in the context of an inﬂation forecast
problem the central bank may fail to foresee a long-term equilibrium real exchange
rate. Moreover, during a debt swapping process, the Central Bank could properly
take advantage of the appreciating movements in the exchange rates, although
the total debt might not change signiﬁcantly towards a reasonable historical level.
Therefore, on one hand, in a short-term perspective, the Central Bank can be
shortsighted in using its main monetary instrument to control the exchange rate
volatility.
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